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Although this is a long review, I only cover perhaps two
thirds of the contents of The Native Mind and the Cultural
Construction of Nature, and very briefly indeed. As the
press release informs us, this book draws on two decades of
research and contains a huge yield of data, analyses, research
protocols, and theoretical background. Folkbiology is the
interdisciplinary perspective on how people ordinarily
understand the biological world (Medin and Atran 1999).
In The Native Mind and the Cultural Construction of
Nature, we appreciate how far the implications of this field
can go. In this overview, I choose a geographical approach:
we fly from Guatemala, to Wisconsin, then to the Middle
East. We then land in university classes and end up in
school classrooms. This tour gives me a minimum basis for
a tentative critical summary of the book. In the tour, I
include not only findings but also research methods that I
hope will be stimulating for readers of this journal.
Guatemala: A “Common Garden Experiment”
In a municipality in El Petén, Guatemala, three cultural
groups live mostly by agriculture, hunting, and extracting
forest products for sale. What happens when a land, lacking
overall institutional regulation, is shared by three cultural
groups with different histories? Traditional models in
decision and game theory predict a “tragedy of the
commons,” i.e. an initial, plausibly cooperative situation
soon subverted by individuals belonging to one of the
groups. These individuals will begin to overexploit com-
mon resources, triggering a cascade of people switching to
non-cooperative behaviors. The result will be tragic: the
rapid depletion of common-pool resources. Remarkably, the
same models predict that common resources will instead be
preserved if—for whatever reason—all individuals of all
groups maintain a resource-saving behavior. But the point
is that saving up or even protecting resources is not at all a
rational choice when you know that some or many others
are not doing the same (or when you have good reasons to
suspect so). The three groups living in Petén—native Itza’
Maya, Spanish-speaking Ladinos, and immigrant Q’eqchi’
Maya—seem to defy such theoretical predictions: they
exhibit different patterns of common-pool resources use.
Atran, Medin and their group wanted to study this
intercultural scenario, exploring in particular the relation
between patterns of use of the forest and ways of
understanding it. In Chapter 7, “Folkecology and the Spirit
of the Commons,” we find an interesting description of
protocols and results of this research.
A series of probes, for example, was used to reveal how
people understand the forest ecology. Each informant was
shown pictures of local plants and animals and was asked
questions about their relations. For each plant, all animal
pictures were laid out and “the informant was asked if any
of the animals ‘search for,’ ‘go with,’ or ‘are companion of’
the target plant, and whether the plant helped or hurt the
animal” (p. 185). The same was done for each animal
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paired with all plants. The pattern of relations emerging
from the task is a model of the forest, a folkecological
model. People are themselves placed in the models through
appropriate questions: each informant is asked to “explain
whether people in their community actually help or hurt
each item on the plant list, and vice versa.”
This experiment was preceded and followed by careful
procedures. Species to be represented in the trials are not
chosen at random, neither are the informats, and suitable
statistical methods are used to analyze results and check for
the possible (not pre-supposed) presence of cultural models
that group together individual performances. I will com-
ment further below and not go into details here, but Atran
and Medin carefully explain all these passages.
Folkecological models can be analyzed in various ways.
They may differ by relational richness and show prevalences
and patterns. Medin and Atran found, for instance, that Itza’
and Ladino groups show a similar pattern of ecological
relations, while Q’eqchi’models are poorer; they also noted a
prevalence of interactions involving “plants helping animals
by providing them food” (p. 186). Deepening the analysis,
researchers found that the Itza’ have the most thorough
comprehension of animals’ impact on plants, including “a
more nuanced appreciation of the relationship between seed
properties and processing” (p. 187). Other key features of
folkecological models are the prevalence of positive vs.
negative relations and the appreciation and understanding of
human impact on the forest, taking in some cases the form of
“commitment to protecting” some species.
Atran and Medin’s research shows that Itza’, with their
rich folkecological models, “believe (on average) that they
have a lot of beneficial impact on important species”
(p. 194). Itza’ are the population with the longest history
of living with the forest in Petén. Their traditions and
language have somehow survived the seventeenth cen-
tury’s conquest and its consequences (pp. 165–172).
Today’s surviving forest, in turn, results from centuries
of interactions with Itza’ people. The study reveals Itza’
protective attitudes that appear to contradict the “tragedy
of the commons” model: “given that other people
(Ladinos, Q’eqchi’) do not protect the trees that Itza’ do,
Itza’ conservation behavior does not seem to make sense
from the individual’s standpoint” (ibid). By understanding
Itza’ folkbiological cognition, Atran and Medin aim to
modify the “commons” model to take account of the non-
tragedy situation in Petén and to draw implications for
agent-based modeling of resource management.
For Itza’, the forest is a player in the game, and a
cooperative one. This is the consequence that Atran and
Medin draw for rational-decision and game-theory accounts
that otherwise model natural resources as inert objects.
Folkbiological research indeed explores the “theory of
mind” that Itza’ at different ages apply to people and to
various kinds of spirits: in brief, in managing the forest,
Itza’ are “playing a game with spirits” who actively protect
the forest, and this could explain why they show cooper-
ative behavior even in the absence of institutions and
regulations, although Medin and Atran warn: “One should
be very cautious in moving from correlations to cause”
(p. 200). With studies in other spots of the world, they try to
check for the reliability and generalizability of their
findings, exploring the interaction among distinct factors
like spiritual values, persistent contact with local habitat as
opposed to migration, cross-generational transmission, and
direct exposure of younger generations to the local ecology.
In general, it seems, “sacred values, per se, are not enough
for sustainability. At the very least, a combination of rich
ecological models and sacred values may be required”
(p. 205). In Atran and Medin’s methodology, individual
cognition—folkecological and folkbiological models in
particular—is tightly linked to large-scale issues of sustain-
ability and resource use and a “unified approach to culture
and cognition can inform—and indeed transform—models
of cultural cognition” (p. 208).
The Distributional View of Culture
and the Folkbiological Module
Chapters 6 and 8 are devoted to the explanation of Atran
and Medin’s idea of culture and to the related methods of
“cultural epidemiology.” I start from the latter to get to the
former. Once folkbiological probes and questions are set
up,1 how should the informants be selected? The guideline
is to maximize coverage of a group in terms of both
diversity and social distance. Borrowing methods from
social network analysis, researchers pick out in the group,
say, six men and six women who are unrelated by kinskip
or marriage, asking them to name the seven most important
people of their life outside the household. Later, these first
informants are asked to name, in order of priority, the seven
people “to whom you would turn if there were something
that you did not understand and wanted to find about the
forest/fishing/hunting” (p. 209). The so-constructed social
network and expert network are then extended by the
“snowball method,” i.e., by assigning the same task to
people at their extremes. Network topology can then be
studied: some networks can be diffuse, others more
clustered (with clear separation in subgroups, such as
1 Actually, Atran and Medin explain the involvement of people
already in the phase of “tailoring” instructions and tests for the
particular group (p. 57). Also, they make explicit their logic in
choosing cultural groups for meaningful comparisons (Sections 3.3
and 3.4, pp. 53–55).
Evo Edu Outreach (2011) 4:158–167 159
gender division), they can have different degrees of
density, and some individuals can be “hyperconnected”
(see Fig. 1).
Besides telling researchers who to administer tests and
probes to, these networks are the basis for understanding the
flow of information about the natural world: the assumption is
that there are pathways along which the community stores,
assimilates, and distributes knowledge, “pathways of learning
about the forest” (p. 213). A limitation of this approach is its
insensitivity to individual direct learning from experience. For
Medin and Atran, however, it is likely that even “walking
alone in the forest” could be driven by cultural information.
Also, the authors have a peculiar theory of folkbiological
learning that I will sketch out below.
A strength of network analysis is that it allows description
of relational dynamics among and across groups. Researchers
get evidence, for example, that Ladinos could be “at least
partly parasitic” on the Itza’ network (p. 214) since some
nodes of the two networks are actually shared individuals,
and Ladinos tend to consider Itza’ people among their experts.
The analysis can thus reveal and explain the tendency toward
similarity among groups.
How does knowledge circulate along the network is, for
Atran and Medin, an open field of research (pp. 215–219).
Social learning involves, for them, inferential processes:
Ladinos, for instance, generalize from Itza’ behaviors by
relying on Ladino’s own taxonomic and ecological knowl-
edge (although a deeper learning is expected through
contact lasting for multiple generations, p. 219). Thus, on
the one hand we have a view of cultures as distributors of
ideas circulating along social networks (and studied
through cultural epidemiology); on the other hand, the
acquisition of these ideas relies on people’s cognitive
processes and is constrained by them.
About folkbiological learning, I think that Atran and
Medin’s position can be synthesized as follows:
We suggest that much of the cultural transmission and
stabilization of ideas…involves the communication of
poor, fragmentary, and elliptical bits of information
Fig. 1 Social networks fot Itza’, Ladinos, and Q’eqchi’ in El Petén, Guatemala. Note the different topologies describing—according to the
“cultural epidemiology” approach—the flow of information about the natural world. Part of Fig. 8.1, p. 211
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that manage to trigger rich and prior inferential
structures (p. 158).
Indeed, the two authors argue for the existence of “evolved
cognitive attitudes” (p.223) that constrain and make
possible biological theories and refer to these attitudes as
a “folkbiological module.” In Chapter 3, they state clearly:
There are strong, universal constraints on how people
organize their local knowledge of biological kinds.
These evolutionary constraints form a “learning land-
scape” that shapes the way inferences are generalized
from particular instances or experiences. In some cases
it produces consensus even though specific inputs vary
widely in richness and content (p. 61).
Cultural variation is thus constrained by the folkbiological
module in our minds. The latter allows us to learn biological
notions through incomplete information, while it channels and
limits the range of cultural differences in biological notions.
To the criticism of “modularity extremism,” Atran and Medin
will answer in Chapter 10:
All we claim is that there is enough there, so that
with some minimal interaction with the world, a
number of candidates for universal principles
emerge…(p. 255).
Some of these “universal folkbiological principles” we
will see below, when we arrive in U.S. classrooms.
Chapter 6 differentiates the distributional view from
seven alternative views. Among these, Atran and Medin
recognize most affinity with “situated cognition” (e.g.,
Cole 1996) and “agent-based modeling” (e.g., Epstein
1999). A peculiarity of Atran and Medin’s contrasting
with other “distributionalists” (Boyd and Richerson 1985)
is their getting rid of the expression “cultural evolution”
(this is a personal comment of mine, and I will return to it
in the summary). Studies of cultural epidemiology start
with gathering information from individuals, choosing
them in a way that allows the best appreciation of
variation. Cultural variation is seen as the key to the
dynamic study of change and stability. It can reveal, for
example, that Itza’ and Ladinos are beginning to merge.
Atran and Medin point out that cultural epidemiology does
not presuppose cultural groups: statistical tools like the
cultural consensus model (CCM, described in Section 3.5,
pp. 57–60; Romney et al. 1986) are used for analyzing
patterns of agreement and disagreement. In fact, applying
CCM to Atran and Medin’s data often results in
identifying just the acknowledged groups, but in principle,
they claim to be avoiding circularity, and in effect, they
are able to highlight interesting intergroup and within-
group phenomena.
Wisconsin: Intergroup Perceptions of Folkbiology
Following Atran and Medin, we now fly to Wisconsin. In
their words:
Our search for U.S. biological experts led us to
Wisconsin, where our attention was quickly captured
by a group that has practiced sustainable forestry for
more than 150 years, the Menominee. Surprisingly,
instead of being seen as natural resource paragons,
Menominee and other Native Americans in
Wisconsin are perceived by many majority-culture
hunters and fishermen as depleting fish and game
resources….We decided to explore the possibility that
differences in mental models of nature were a key
factor in this intergroup conflict (p. 226).
In Chapter 9, “Mental Models and Intergroup Conflict in
North America,” Medin and Atran tell with remarkable
detail (pp. 225–233) the long history of the Native
American Menominee people, the many threats that were
brought to their contact with land, and their “impressive
resilience” to such threats (p. 233): “the Menominee,” the
authors write, “have demonstrated time after time that they
are unwilling to trade their forest, lakes, and rivers” (p.
234). The Menominee have lived in their current reserva-
tion in Wisconsin since 1854, and they hold rights of self-
regulation on hunting, fishing, and water and forest
products management. Shawano County, Wisconsin, is the
“majority-culture” context where the reservation is located.
Despite generally good relationships and interchange,
natural resources seem to be a matter of conflict: “there is
resentment on the part of majority-culture sportsmen of
tribes setting their own hunting and fishing regulations….
Typically these differences are seen as resource depleting”
(p. 236). Quite evidently, this is an ideal situation where
Atran and Medin can study folk models.
A fundamental element of their approach I didn’t
mention before is ground-truthing:
The maintenance of the forest in light of large-scale
deforestation in the surroundings as well as constant
economic incentives to the contrary [is] quite impres-
sive and provide a literal ground-truthing of
Menominee respect for nature (p. 234).
The study of mental models is incomplete without
corresponding observations and measurements of actual
practices, all the more so if researchers aim—like Atran and
Medin—to convince other scientists and to influence
policymakers (see, e.g., “Conclusions,” p. 269). Also in
the case of Petén, self-reporting of forestry practice was not
at all sufficient to establish differences among the three
groups: researchers measured plot sizes, species diversity in
plots, number, coverage and frequency of trees, soil
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chemical composition, dimension and dispersion of fires,
and so on. Mental models correlate with patterns of use,
which can be observed, and the effects measured when you
“map different patterns of use onto an overall measure of
destructiveness” (p. 174).
Getting back to Wisconsin, Atran and Medin point out
the health of Menominee forest in comparison with
surrounding deforestation, a fact that one can appreciate
with a simple look at satellite images (try it). Observations
of this kind, together with the fact that Menominee have
carried on self-regulated forestry practices for 150 years at
least, are the necessary ground-truthing of studies of mental
models and intra- and intergroup perception.
A naive view would oppose the close-to-nature, deep-
rooted and forest-committed Menominee to the shallow-
rooted, ignorant and resource-depleting majority-culture
sportsmen. Atran and Medin’s study give us a much more
complex view: the mental models and amount of ecolog-
ical knowledge appear pretty similar in the two groups.
Rather, subtle differences in the organization or “orienta-
tion” of their knowledge would be the source of reciprocal
misrepresentations and stereotypes, reinforced by mass
media coverage. Several probes were administered to
experts from the two groups about fish and fishing. They
exhibited consensus on species categorization and showed
detailed knowledge about the life cycle and ecological
relations of fish. According to Medin and Atran, however,
knowledge in the two groups is differently oriented:
“majority-culture experts organize their knowledge around
goals that target adult fish” (p. 239) and are less ready to
give answers in terms of life cycle and ecology. Group
differences disappear if tasks are run at a slower pace.
Another difference between the groups is the degree of
robustness of folkbiological models across the distinction
between experts and non-experts, which in the
Menominee is higher.
I think that many readers will enjoy how Atran and
Medin’s group sets up probes and tests to explore the
aspects of folkbiological knowledge which are more
relevant to their research questions. In the case of
Menominee and majority-culture in Wisconsin, researchers
“wondered how the differences in orientation might be
reflected in values and attitudes toward different fishing
practices” (p. 240) and therefore set up three tasks: (1)
ranking of fish, to assess the relative importance of different
species for the individual; (2) ranking of goals, to ground
the idea that groups go fishing with different aims; (3)
rating of fishing practices, wherein the authors expected to
see reflected the values concerning fishing. Having found
broad intergroup commonalities and similarities in all three
tasks, they had the idea of asking informants of each group
for detailed expectations upon the answers by people from
the other group, as well as by the average person from his/
her own group. With this procedure Atran, Medin and
colleagues were able to show and analyze mispercep-
tions and perceptual amplification of intergroup differ-
ences: “majority-culture fishermen hold strong, incorrect
expectations concerning Menominee attitudes and values”
(p. 248). In reading these reports, I grasp very clearly how
encounters between different “folkbiologies” can have
dramatic effects on evironmental policy and decision-
making at all scales, even—and this is the case—when
line common values and interest in conservation are
present. These very analyses of misperceptions and search
for their sources (pp. 249–253) are, for Atran and Medin,
a necessary contribution.
Middle East: The Frontier of Reseach
From the forest of Wisconsin, before ending in our
classrooms, we fly to the West Bank and Gaza. Although
the book is very brief about these scenarios, I think it is
meaningful to see The Native Mind and the Cultural
Construction of Nature as a stepping-stone in an ongoing,
expansive research program. Atran, Medin and their group
involved themselves in new field sites in the Middle East,
Southeast Asia, and elsewhere: quite recent papers report
surveys of Jewish Israelis living in the West Bank and Gaza
(Ginges et al. 2007), studies with Palestinian and Israeli
leaders (Atran et al. 2007), and others about “emerging
clashes between the Muslim and Judeo-Christian world”
(p. 272). Such an iterated “branching out” of research is
fueled, I think, by several factors. One can be the need for
more varied empirical cases for the generalization of
models and specific findings. But another factor is the
aspiration that the cognitive–anthropological analysis de-
veloped for Petén and Wisconsin be somehow applied in all
cases of cultural and political conflicts, being of some help
in the search for solutions. In this movement, I see Atran
and Medin making it clear that folkbiology and folkecology
are likely to be at the very heart of the great majority of
conflicts. The centrality of environmental resources for life
is related to the ways people think about resources and act
upon them. Spiritual values involving nature and land can
have dramatic effects on cognitive handling of conflicts. By
proposing “rational” trade-offs, for example, politicians can
yield effects which are contrary to their goal: in political
disputes like the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, instrumentally
driven trade-offs can exacerbate violent opposition to
compromise solutions, “while noninstrumental symbolic
compromises may reduce support for violence” (p. 272).
Research is stemming out of contexts that are theoretically
and socially uneasy. In reporting results, this implies an
uncommon amount of effort in justification and response to
critics, as is evident throughout this book. I take as an example
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pp. 255–258 in the “Conclusions,” where Medin and Atran
briefly (once again) respond, in order to critics of modularity
and charges of biological determinism and to critics of the
analogy between cultural and biological evolution, to the
possible bias of their research in favor of neglected and
oppressed groups and to the charge of shallow ethnography. I
will return to some of these criticisms in my summary, but I
think that part of these researchers’ exposure is related to their
involvement in situations of conflict, of possible cultural
misperceptions, of unequal distribution of resources of
endangered societies and cultures; and it is also due to their
strong commitment to their studies, that they believe
potentially relevant to policy making and problem solving.
This kind of research requires adopting a multidisciplinary
approach, sometimes perhaps stretching the boundaries of
disciplines a little bit more than what is normally allowed, and
it is also demanding in economic terms:
Detailed analyses of the relations between ecology,
technology, social networks, and so forth require large
interdisciplinary efforts, over many field seasons, at a
cost that usually exceeds typical ethnographic field-
work by one or several levels of magnitude (p. 161).
It is evident that for this group, the game is worth the
candle.
U.S. Undergraduates: A Degenerated Population
We arrive now at the most used research context for
cognitive psychology: university classes. Bringing together
their folkbiological studies in small-scale societies, Medin
and Atran substantiate the (indeed, familiar) criticism of
generalizations drawn from the undergraduate population.
They formulate the “cautionary tale” that “at least in the
case of folkbiology, standard populations may be nonstan-
dard and vice versa” (p. 114), and cognitive processes
considered as normal might be actually the “failure to
undergo ‘normal’ perceptual development” (p. 110). In
Medin and Atran’s account, we humans have a mental
module: the FBS, folkbiological system (they argue at
length about conditions, distinctions, and counterarguments
for this thesis, e.g., on pp. 63–67 and 114–119). The
module is innate and universal, but it needs contact with
nature for its development. Undergraduate students (and
non-expert Western people in general) lack such necessary
contact, and their atypicality becomes clear in comparison
with other cultural groups: from “standard population” they
become the “odd group out.”
Chapter 4 is the longest (almost 60 pp.) and most
difficult of the book, and it is itself a description and
tentative synthesis of several other works. So my
synthesis here will be very rough, just an invitation to
read directly to appreciate the complexity of the research
and objectives. The central core of the chapter is
people’s biological induction, i.e., their use of reasoning
for a generalization of biological properties from a taxon
to more inclusive groups. The other pillar of the chapter
is folktaxonomy, i.e., the hierarchical organization of
taxa which is the necessary support for biological
induction. I focus mainly on induction and leave
taxonomy for the next section.
The study of undergraduates (Osherson et al. 1990) has
elucidated how they use a model called SCM (similarity
coverage model) in which biological induction relies on
perceived similarity. Students’ induction was tested by
means of questions such as: “if species X and Y are subject
to a disease, how likely is it that all Z will be subject to
such disease?” X and Y could be, for example, cow and
mouse, and Z, mammals. It was shown that similarity was
the base for induction: indeed, inductive strength
(i.e., willingness to generalize) was increased if X and Y
were typical organisms, similar to the majority of the
category (typicality effect); strength of induction was also
increased if X and Y were two highly diverse organisms
(diversity effect). In both cases, a good coverage is based
on similarity and justifies induction. In Chapter 4, Medin
and Atran put into discussion this model and strongly
criticize its supposed definition as a “standard” or “basic”
model of biological reasoning.
Diversity effect, for example, is completely absent in
Itza’Maya and U.S. experts, whereas undergraduate students
appear to learn it and to increasingly use it throughout the
tests (p. 87). Interestingly, diversity effect was also observed
to a certain degree in some U.S. taxonomists (p. 73): Medin
and Atran then consider the idea that scientific systematics
might be one factor influencing biological reasoning.
Diversity effect could be explained by a learned theory of
context-free, “causal unity underlying disparate species” (p.
72).
But the most important point here is that Itza’ and
experts use a completely different kind of reasoning for
biological induction: they preferentially use causal, context-
sensitive, ecological connections as a guide for induction.
Simply put, for example, a disease will be spread among
species if they entertain ecological relations, if their
geographical ranges overlap, and so on. Quite interestingly,
Medin and Atran found evidence that undergraduates do
not lack some degree of ecological information. Rather,
they do not consider it relevant (Sperber and Wilson 1986)
to biological inference. Students normally rely heavily on
abstract reasoning, but they can purposefully be helped to
bring background knowledge that violates similarity into
relevance (see pp. 91–92): with “careful attention...reason-
ing strategies that are salient among experts and Itza’” can
be brought out in students (p. 92).
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Comparative studies also put typicality effect into
discussion. Undergraduates make strong use of the central
tendency criterion: a typical organism is one that is
perceptually average in the category. Accordingly, typical-
ity seems to be determined by the intrinsic structure of the
biological domain. But in all other groups—and indeed in
deeper studies of the “standard” population—typicality
appears to depend on extrinsic factors, like desirability,
familiarity, and idealness. Once again, the standard popu-
lation is revealed to be the odd group. Atran and Medin
draw the need for an “alternative approach” to biological
reasoning, one that “allows for strong influences of more
extrinsic factors like ideals, goals, and habits of mind—
even in domains that, like biology, have rich instrinsic
structure” (p. 100). Many readers will likely be interested in
consequences for learning, which Atran and Medin make
explicit:
We think that it is very unlikely that category learning
is a passive, bottom-up process that reflects intrinsic
structure without bias. It is much more likely that the
most relevant (and ideal) examples are learned first
and that these initial representations guide further
learning (ibid).
Summing up, the folkbiological cognitive system of
people populating major universities is underdeveloped due
to the lack of contact with the natural world. Nonetheless,
models of biological cognition have been built on such
“standard” population: taxonomical relations based on
perceptual similarity have been seen as the support for
biological induction, guided by principles of typicality and
diversity. Similarity has been considered an intrinsic
structural property of the biological world, detected by
perception. Alternative models are required to account for
biological inference in almost all other groups, such as
small-scale society peoples and U.S. experts. For these
groups, ecological and causal relations prevail on taxonomy
in induction; the diversity effect is not supported by an
abstract and generalized principle of “common cause,” and
typicality is strongly influenced by cultural factors. These
new models can also describe biological cognition in
undergraduates, furthermore explaining its “devolution”
and offering some guide for teaching biology.
In the Classroom: Urban U.S. Children
Finally (actually, in Chapter 5 out of ten), we see
researchers interviewing children in classrooms, looking at
textbooks and analyzing practices in science education
(diagrams, discourse style, compatibility between school
and community, etc.). Their findings in this field are only at
a preliminary stage, but the whole research program seems
to bear a message for education, i.e., the critical importance
of understanding the relationship between formal and
informal learning and the fact that “cultural knowledge,
values, and models are an important part of the story”
(p. 141). Science education is not culturally neutral: it can
conflict with folkbiology on the level of facts, in how
knowledge is organized, as well as in cultural models and
values. A particularly telling example cited by Medin and
Atran is the following:
…Menominee children have a precocious understand-
ing of biology. Indeed, on standardized tests, fourth-
grade Menominee score above the national average in
science and it is their best subject. Strikingly,
however, by eighth grade, science is their very worst
subject and they score below the national average.
The fact that reading scores do not show a
corresponding drop suggests that something peculiar
to science instruction is the key. At a minimum these
observations indicate that the educational systems are
not taking advantage of the knowledge that
Menominee children are bringing to the classroom
(p. 138).
Even the youngest Menominee children show patterns of
induction based on ecological relations. They don’t show a
pattern which has been long studied in urban U.S. children,
i.e., anthropocentric asymmetry of induction: urban chil-
dren are more willing to generalize from humans to animals
than vice versa, and this asymmetry was seen as evidence
that folkbiology derives from folkpsychology (Carey 1985).
Atran and Medin, supporting the idea of an independent
folkbiological module, challenge this view: the anthropo-
centrism observed in young children “does not reflect a
failure to distinguish biology from psychology. Part of the
story may be that humans are the only biological entity that
urban children knew very much about” (p. 122).
Research with Maya, Menominee, and rural children brings
evidence that familiarity is an important factor in induc-
tion. Children’s familiarity with many species and with
ecological relations makes the anthropocentric asymmetry
disappear.
U.S. children, and above all those who live in an urban
environment, are for Medin and Atran under the effect of
devolution. In Chapter 2, “Universals and Devolution,”
they explain the concept and give some ground-truthing to
it by statistically analyzing the names of trees in the Oxford
English Dictionary from 1525 to 1925. As usual, the
analysis is not simplistic and tries to explain correlations
and tendencies in detail. In the twentieth century, terms for
naming trees undergo a steep decline. Linguistic richness is
correlated with richness of experience, but extinction of
terms can be slower than the “extinction of experience”
(i.e. devolution): “the language may preserve certain
164 Evo Edu Outreach (2011) 4:158–167
distinctions beyond the time these distinctions are still
understood….When knowledge declines, the structure, like
an abandoned building, may remain for a while” (p. 47).
This lapidary expression bears the serious view Medin and
Atran have of the situation in highly industrialized societies
and the related cognitive effects with which scientific
instruction must deal every day.
Shrinking of terminology is not all. There is also a
decrease of specificity, and this relates to the important
theme of folktaxonomy. We consider it briefly now. Medin
and Atran make a strong and clear claim on taxonomy:
Biological taxonomies seem to be culturally univer-
sal; and they are structured enough to impose
constraints on possible theories (p. 28).
Broad, cross-cultural similarities in folktaxonomy—and
between folktaxonomy and scientific systematics—are for
Atran and Medin once again evidence of the existence of a
mental module that, suitably stimulated, organizes the
biological domain. The nested categories of folktaxonomy
are: kingdoms, life forms, generic species. Species are often
subdivided into folkspecifics, where the correspondence
between folk and scientific systematics begins to blur.
Intermediate folktaxa can also be possible between generic
species and life form. Folk kingdoms distinguish plants and
animals from the rest of the world:
From an early age, it appears, humans cannot help but
conceive of any object they see in the world as either
being or not being an animal, and there is evidence
for an early distinction between plants and nonliving
things (p. 29).
Life forms (e.g., “tree”) are more specific, characterized
by a small number of perceptual diagnostics. The most
universal and conceptually important category is generic
species:
Ethnobiologists…tend to agree that this level best
captures discontinuities in nature and provides the
fundamental constituents in all systems of folkbio-
logical categorization, reasoning, and use (p. 31).
Children share all the universal aspects of folkbiology.
They have, for example, the idea of an “underlying causal
nature, or essence” (p. 21), tested through probes on
heredity and questions on fictional cross-species adoptions
(section 5.3 of the book). Their folktaxonomical capacities
are in place despite the steep devolution and loss of
familiarity with nature they are experiencing, and “it is
little wonder” for Medin and Atran since
Folkbiological taxonomies tend to be among the most
stable, widely distributed, and conservative cognitive
structures in any culture. Once set into place, such a
structure would likely survive even catastrophic
historical unpheaval to a clearly recognizable degree
(p. 36).
Similar taxonomies can be used differently: under-
graduates use taxonomy as a “stand-in for ideas about the
likely distribution of biologically related properties,”
whereas “for the Itza’ (and other knowledgeable groups),
the taxonomy may constrain the likely operational range of
ecological agents and causes” (p. 114). Categories of
folktaxonomy can exhibit different relative salience and
inductive force: Itza’ can be unwilling to generalize above
the species level, whereas undergraduates and urban
children can be willing to generalize to life form level (loss
of specificity). If you want more information, you must
read Chapters 4 and 5 of the book: “Devolution and
Relative Expertise” and “Development of Folkbiological
Cognition.”
Still there is—for Atran and Medin—room to help
children improve their biological reasoning and to try to
set up science instruction in a way that respects
folkbiological cognition of so-called “minority
groups”—appearing, in this case, a model for the so-
called “standard population.” And here I close with a
suggestive quotation on the topic:
Imagine tourists from a country where people drive
on the right side of the road are transported to
another culture where people drive on the left.
[As pedestrians], all of their attentional habits for
looking before crossing will only get in the way….
The analogy is straightforward: the set of practices
Native American children bring to the classrooms
are ones that are natural outside of school, but
create a clash in the classroom, because the rules
are different there (p. 274).
Critical Summary
The Native Mind and the Cultural Construction of Nature is
a valuable and rich product of an outstanding research
program that is growing in far-off spots of the world,
brought forth by a multidisciplinary, lively community of
experts with their graduate students and driven by fascinat-
ing questions like: How do people conceptualize nature,
how do they organize taxonomy and induction in the
biological domain? How does understanding of nature
relate to decisions and actions? How is individual cognition
related to culture, and how does it vary across and within
cultures? How is cognition affected by a prolonged lack of
contact with natural environment? How is culture transmit-
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ted and developed along social networks? Can a focus on
biological cognition make sense of intergroup conflicts and
help to find ways out of them?
This book is not a manual, definitely. Rather, it is a
super-rich work-in-progress of what is now becoming a
research tradition at the intersection of different disciplines.
Such essence makes the book very demanding, but very
attractive too. Believe it or not, there are many, many more
questions and tentative answers therein than those I listed
above. In reading, I had the exciting—and, at times,
frustrating—feeling of being thrown into the ongoing
research: I followed questions germinating one from the
other; I attended to the smart design of experiments and to
the struggle to interpret a large amount of data, getting into
them from several, slightly different points of view; I
assisted with the diligent filling-in of background informa-
tion (historical, theoretical), and so on.
One thing I personally like in the book is the complete
absence of the binomial expression “cultural evolution.” It
is not that the authors fail to recognize the analogies
between their distributional view of culture and evolution-
ary biology: they remark in theoretical paragraphs that “like
modern biology, the distributional view of cultural phe-
nomena does not take individual variation as deviation but
as a core object of study” (p. 221); they notice that in both
domains, variation is seen as the basis of dynamics. Studies
of cultural change that have some analogy with biological
evolution are often put under the rubric of “cultural
evolution.” In this case—as well as in others, I believe—
the label could be particularly confusing: biology pervades
the book as the content of cultural knowledge and
cognition, and evolutionary biology is also called forth as
a framework—if not an explanation—for the existence of a
folkbiological module in our minds. Invoking evolution to
also support—like a blueprint—the models of cultural
change would have been really misleading. Perhaps Medin
and Atran’s example could promote the simple and
sufficient expression of “cultural change.”
Among possible criticisms of this work, I select two: one
on the modularity of mind and one on what the authors call
“scientific biological taxonomy.” I will close then with my
most important criticism, about the book’s structure.
Many authors have pointed out epistemological flaws and
empirical problems arising in evolutionary explanations of
this or that particular characteristic of the human mind. “The
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme” [Gould and
Lewontin 1979] is an early and paradigmatic example of
such reaction; The Growth of Biological Thought. Diversity,
Evolution, and Inheritance [Dupré 2003] is more recent and
specific on evolutionary psychology). I must say that Atran
and Medin show that they are aware of the traps of
backwards extrapolation and construction of adaptive “just-
so stories” for the structures we are interested in legitimizing
(e.g., pp. 63–65, 114–118, 255). Indeed, they emphasize
evidence for this module existing and operating here and
now, and this seems to reduce the importance of evolutionary
support. Even so, the many modulations described, and the
formalization of the concept of “devolution”—namely, the
importance of natural and cultural environments in cognitive
development—seem to leave us with weak support for the
existence, uniqueness, autonomy, and importance of the
folkbiological module. Much weaker, indeed, than the support
we have for a linguistic module (see Sterelny 2003). Too
weak, maybe: the existence of the folkbiological module
looks like an unfalsifiable assumption, defended by means of
a growing number of ad hoc hypotheses that explain its
variation across cultures. In this light, I think that Atran and
Medin’s arguments are best seen as the defense of a working
hypothesis that is proving to be useful in their program.
Readers and researchers should not forget, however, that
such a working hypothesis rules out mechanisms of social
learning that—for other authors—could be largely suffi-
cient, in conjuction with the structure of the natural world,
for an elegant explanation of folkbiological universals and
variations among different cultures (e.g., Sterelny 2003,
Chapter 10).
About scientific taxonomy, I hope that at a certain
point of their research this group engages more thor-
oughly the lively debate on taxonomy and systematics
which is going on within science and philosophy of
biology (e.g., Mayr 1982; Ereshefsky 2001). By now,
Atran and Medin treat scientific taxonomy as a system
which is external to the analysis, a system that folk-
taxonomies can approach more or less closely. By doing
so, although they present scientific taxonomy as an
historical product (pp. 25–28), they tend to consider it as
a rather unitary, established ending point. This move
perhaps plays a role in their argument for folkbiology, but
it neglects, for example, the existence of different
scientific taxonomical schools (see, e.g., Hull 1970; Haber
2008), of different views that sometimes compete and
conflict in the endeavor of ordering the biological world.
Symptoms of some of these dynamics are reflected in
Atran and Medin’s own exposition where they put forth
scientific taxonomy at times as phylogenetic organization,
while other times as based on similarity. They are
definitely aware of the debate (e.g., p. 277), and their
choice is deliberate (e.g., p. 77). Ecological reasoning,
emphasized in the people of small-scale societies, is a
further part—a struggling part sometimes—of scientific
taxonomy. Cognitive variety and complexity is thus seen
in science as well. Probably, this will be a relevant and
necessary topic for the deepening of the research on
biological reasoning. Surely, it is relevant for biology
education (e.g., Thanukos 2009).
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The aspect of this book I want to criticize most seriously is
its organization. I already mentioned the vastness and
complexity of content. In short, I do not think that the book’s
structure helps the reader to approach it and become involved.
Chapters 1 to 3 (pp. 1–61) seem to me a long, long
introduction collecting disciplinary justifications, theoretical
definitions, broad general claims, a brief history of taxonomy,
a survey supporting devolution—a concept that in my opinion
only becomes clear in Chapter 4—and other sub-arguments.
Folk examples in this part of the book are poorly contextu-
alized since they concern populations that will be introduced
later in the book. On the other hand, the “Material and
Methods” section (Chapter 3) is redundant with other parts
(e.g., Chapters 7 and 9). With Chapter 4, things don’t seem to
get better: this is an astonishingly long chapter (60 pp.),
dedicated to the complex task of bringing together evidence
on a range of topics and from a number of different research
projects. While all the reported findings are interesting and
important, the way they are presented is not facilitating and
inviting for the first approach of a general reader. I thought that
the book could instead be seen as a huge expansion of a paper,
with the first part containing the (multi)disciplinary context,
background, and potential competing visions addressed to
colleagues (the choice to begin in Chapter 4 with undergrad-
uate students may indeed seem a disciplinary standard in
cognitive psychology). But the “long paper” vision does not
hold upwell since significant pieces of theoretical background
are also scattered throughout the book (e.g., Chapters 6 and 8).
The second half of The Native Mind and the Cultural
Construction of Nature is overall more accessible, and that is
why I started my review from there. I don’t think that the
complexity of a research program can justify an organization
which is not functional for the reader, or at least for a
selected kind of reader.
In sum, the structure of this book does not help our
approach to this interesting and important research. The
content is all in there anyway, and I hope that this review will
be useful as a “tourist guide” for readers and that it may also
serve in encouraging people to read the book and to become
sensitive to this ongoing, remarkable research enterprise.
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